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It may seem odd, our writing about international 
monetary reform. It has been not much in the news 
since April 1976, when a revised International Mone-
tary Fund Articles of Agreement, a new international 
monetary constitution produced with great effort and 
anguish, was made public. We believe, though, that 
before too long finance ministers and their experts 
will again turn, if perhaps with less flourish than last 
time, to the task of monetary reform. That appears an 
odds-on bet, for even as it was being published many 
governments were lamenting their new constitution, 
particularly the part which made floating exchange 
rates legal. Nor has the experience of the past two and 
a half years been reassuring. Among governments, 
there is now more opposition to floating rates than 
there was in early 1976. 
What concerns us is that governments may not 
understand what their options are. And presumptu-
ous though it may be, that is why we write: to explain 
which international economic policy regimes are 
feasible and which are not. 
It is reason enough for concern that academic 
experts in international economics have shown so 
little understanding of what the feasible choices of 
governments are. Many of the most eminent have 
long urged a hands-off or libertarian regime, under 
which there is no official exchange market inter-
vention and international borrowing and lending are 
not at all restricted. But that regime is not feasible. 
Under it, there is no equilibrium; more specifically, 
equilibrium exchange rates are not determined. 
We can put this point another way. Having 
floating exchange rates is feasible only when inter-
national borrowing and lending are effectively pro-
hibited by law, or in other words only with portfolio 
autarky. There is a floating rate regime—the port-
folio autarky/floating rate or PA/F regime—under 
which there is no official exchange market inter-
vention and international borrowing and lending are 
prohibited. And that regime is feasible. Under it, 
there is an equilibrium, an equilibrium characterized 
by trade balance, for every choice of budget or 
domestic economic policies. But the libertarian 
regime—which we sometimes refer to as the laissez-
faire/floating rate or LF/F regime—although vigor-
ously advocated by Professor Milton Friedman and 
others, is not feasible for any choice of budget 
policies. 
Our other essential point (much more easily 
accepted, we are sure) is that no fixed exchange rate 
regime is feasible except when governments, fore-
swearing autonomy, continuously run identical bud-
get surpluses or deficits (identical in the sense that 
their respective national debts, inclusive of their 
noninterest-bearing liabilities, increase or decrease at 
the same percentage rate). 
There is a clear implication. If governments want 
autonomy, independence in choosing budget poli-
cies, then they must prohibit international borrowing 
and lending. More particularly, each must insist that 
its citizenry hold only its money. 
Such capital controls are distorting, though, and 
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And that should give governments pause. Is auton-
omy worth what, directly and indirectly, it costs? We 
think not and at another time will make a case for the 
best of international economic policy regimes: that 
under which international borrowing and lending are 
unrestricted, all government budgets are continu-
ously in balance, and exchange rates are coopera-
tively and indefinitely maintained at previously speci-
fied values. But here we content ourselves with 
establishing the fundamental choice of governments: 
they can enjoy autonomy in budget policies, but only 
if they are willing to impose and enforce compliance 
with severely restrictive capital controls. 
Fiat Money: Intrinsically Useless 
Undeniably, the world economy is a paper or fiat 
money economy. It long has been; we are now several 
decades beyond the time when gold was replaced by 
national fiat monies. And as all would also agree, fiat 
money is intrinsically useless. It is never wanted for its 
own sake. Neither directly nor indirectly does it have 
any value in consumption. (That is why it has so 
intrigued economists. Why then does it have a posi-
tive price? But that is by the way.) If an individual 
gives up wheat, say, for a certain number of pieces of 
paper, that is only because she or he expects that later 
on another individual will take those pieces of paper 
in exchange for wine or some other commodity that 
has value in consumption. 
Something very important follows, though, from 
the intrinsic uselessness of fiat money. A kind of 
dominance is implied: If individuals are free to 
choose from among several assets, a fiat money being 
one, and if another of those assets has a greater 
(expected) return in all circumstances, then no one 
will want to hold the fiat money. Suppose to the 
contrary that someone does. That individual is will-
ing to trade valuable commodities for some fiat 
money, even though she or he could enjoy more 
consumption subsequently by acquiring the higher-
yielding asset. And why? Any explanation contra-
dicts what must be accepted, that fiat money is 
intrinsically useless. 
Someone will perhaps object that we have over-
looked the obvious: exchange is costly, and the use of 
paper money minimizes that cost. But it is not wrong 
to overlook the obvious when the obvious is not 
relevant. The world we know is one with several fiat 
monies. Nearly every national government has its 
own. So there is a choice of which to hold or use as the 
medium of exchange. Thus, to recognize that ex-
change is costly is not to deny that one fiat money can 
dominate another or that fiat monies are perfect 
substitutes, each for all the others. The most efficient 
way of making exchanges may be by using paper 
money. But that is not why the Mexican peso is the 
medium of exchange in Mexico or why the Israeli 
pound is the medium of exchange in Israel. The 
explanation is to be found in the policies of govern-
ments. 
The unconstrained demands for fiat monies 
(national currencies) are, then, very special. Being 
demands for perfect substitutes, they are of the all-or-
nothing variety. Depending on how rates of return 
compare, any individual wants to hold only country X 
money or only country Y money. Thus, with perfect 
freedom of portfolio choice, equilibrium exchange 
rates can't be expected to change. Indeed, if individ-
uals were never surprised, then equilibrium exchange 
rates would be constant over time. The argument is 
essentially that which establishes the well-known in-
terest arbitrage condition of the international eco-
nomics literature. That condition says that the risk-
less nominal interest rates of any two countries, X 
and Y, can differ only by the expected change in the 
country X-country Y exchange rate. But for fiat 
monies the nominal rates of return are zero. Hence, 
so is the expected change in the exchange rate. That 
is a direct consequence of the intrinsic uselessness of 
fiat money. 
The Libertarian Regime: 
An Indeterminate Equilibrium 
The libertarian regime advocated by so many aca-
demic economists (what we're calling the laissez-
faire/floating rate or LF/F regime) is characterized 
by perfect freedom of portfolio choice and no official 
exchange market intervention. And under it there is 
no equilibrium. Because fiat monies are intrinsically 
useless and money demands are therefore of the all-
or-nothing variety, the equilibrium of the LF/F 
regime is indeterminate. 
To say the same thing another way, the LF/F 
regime has an equilibrium for not one but every 
choice of exchange rate values. With the time paths 
of the national monies given, any set of unchanging 
exchange rate values determines a time path of the 
3 world money supply
1 —and so an equilibrium. More-
over, the world money supply time paths implied by 
different sets of exchange rate values are different, 
and so are the equilibria. But exchange rate values do 
have to be specified. There are no market-deter-
mined equilibrium values. 
Those reared on conventional theory may find 
that conclusion hard to accept. For that theory, in 
any of its variants, certainly does say that the LF/F 
regime has an equilibrium. That contrasting con-
clusion and the others of the conventional theory are, 
however, the fruits of implicit theorizing. What al-
most all contributors to the balance-of-payments or 
exchange-rate literature have assumed is that the 
residents of country X want always to hold only the 
money supplied by the government of country X and 
that the residents of country Y want always to hold 
only the money supplied by their government. Re-
cently, a few have assumed that there is limited 
currency substitution, that the residents of countries 
X and Y want always to hold diversified portfolios of 
national monies.
2 But neither assumption is consis-
tent with the intrinsic uselessness of fiat money. So to 
assume, for example, that the residents of countries X 
and Y want always to hold only the monies of their 
respective governments is implicitly to assume that 
those residents are restricted in their portfolio 
choices. That is why the conclusions of the con-
ventional balance-of-payments theory are the fruits 
of implicit theorizing. Those conclusions are, then, 
less general than has been thought. More particu-
larly, they are not valid for the LF/F or libertarian 
regime. 
As pointed out above, it cannot be argued in 
defense of either assumption that, after all, country X 
money is the medium of exchange in country X and 
country Y money is the medium of exchange in coun-
try Y. In a truly libertarian regime, what to use as the 
medium of exchange is a matter of choice. 
It is hardly short of mind-boggling, the contrast 
between the conventional assumptions about bonds 
and monies. What many authors have assumed, 
presumably to approximate the fact that the world 
economy is much more integrated than it once was, is 
that there is perfect capital mobility; the bonds of 
countries X and Y, if of equal riskiness, are perfect 
substitutes. Those are the very same authors, though, 
who have assumed that the residents of, say, country 
X want always to hold only the money of the govern-
ment of country X. 
We do not say that individuals will never want to 
hold diversified portfolios of national currencies. If 
there is the right kind of uncertainty about govern-
ment policies, they will. (Note, however, that not any 
kind of uncertainty will do.) But uncertainty about 
government policies is not a characteristic of the 
libertarian regime. Advocates of that regime (our 
LF/F regime) appreciate fully that lessening uncer-
tainty will produce a welfare gain and surely would 
have governments indicate that they will maintain it 
indefinitely. 
Nor do we say that individuals will never be 
observed holding only the monies supplied by their 
respective governments. They will be if they are 
bound by sufficiently stringent capital controls. They 
may be when governments are following certain 
exchange market intervention schemes. But it is not 
right to interpret observations generated by partic-
ular regimes as revealing money demands that hold 
generally. And that is what many have done. 
A Qualification and a Claim 
If money demands are of the all-or-nothing variety, 
then, any anticipated decrease in, say, the value of 
the Canadian dollar must produce an unbounded 
flight from Canadian money. That may seem far-
fetched, and in a way we agree. Economists are not 
very good at predicting what happens in the short 
run, as long as inertia or economic friction is a potent 
force. Think of two deluxe hotels, the accommo-
dations of which are perfect or almost perfect substi-
tutes. The first cuts its room rate. Does the second 
'We can be read as assuming that the supply of, for example, the 
money of the government of country X, as it varies over time, is 
determined by that government's budget deficits. In our view, though, 
the composition of a national debt, as between interest- and non-
interest-bearing debt, hardly matters. The detailed argument is 
developed in two papers by John Bryant and Neil Wallace: The 
Inefficiency of a Nominal National Debt, Research Department Staff 
Report 28, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, October 1977; and 
Open Market Operations in a Model of Regulated Insured Inter-
mediaries,, Research Department Staff Report 34, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, March 1978. 
2See Lance Girton and Don Roper, Theory and Implications of 
Currency Substitution, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, March 1978; and Guillermo Calvo and Carlos Rodriguez, "A 
Model of Exchange Rate Determination Under Currency Substitution 
and Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85, 
No. 3, pp. 617-25. 
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but that seems unlikely. Economists are pretty good, 
though, at predicting what happens in the long run, 
after inertia is spent. And that is how we interpret the 
implications of our all-or-nothing money demands, as 
predictions of what sooner or later must come true. 
Almost all would agree that there would be an 
unbounded flight from Canadian money if, with 
probability of unity, people expected the U.S. dollar 
to appreciate indefinitely at a rate of, say, 50 percent 
per year. And what if the certain expectations were 
25 percent per year? Or 5 percent per year? Whatever 
the rate, the basic incentive is still there. Any positive 
rate implies a continuing loss of wealth for owners of 
Canadian money. And what we argue is that, if ex-
periencing continuing losses, individuals will sooner 
or later overcome the force of inertia. Advocates of 
the libertarian or LF/F regime must argue that they 
never will, that inertia will forever remain a potent 
force, and that seems to us more than a little im-
plausible. 
We would also insist that the LF/F regime has 
never been observed. If someone can point to a 
historical instance, our assertion is clearly false. 
Recall, though, what we said earlier on: although 
uncertainty about government policies may make 
individuals want to hold a diversified portfolio of 
national monies (and hence give a determinate equi-
librium), it is not a characteristic of the LF/F regime. 
For that regime, individuals must be reasonably sure 
that governments will never impose portfolio restric-
tions or manage exchange rates. Then, too, portfolio 
restrictions can take subtle form; it is not always easy 
to decide whether a particular historical regime 
approximates the LF/F regime. 
Consider, for example, the regime under which 
U.S. and Canadian residents have been living re-
cently. Some would perhaps interpret it as an in-
stance of the LF/F regime. We would not, since it 
seems very likely that market participants have all 
along believed that at some exchange rate value the 
Canadian or U.S. government would intervene by 
severely restricting portfolio choices. And as we said 
before, under the LF/F regime that threat has a zero 
or near-zero probability. 
Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 
What, then, of fixed exchange rate regimes? If gov-
ernments persist in different budget policies, none of 
them is feasible. 
In principle, chosen exchange rate values can be 
maintained in two ways: cooperatively or nonco-
operatively. Again, think of two countries, X and Y, 
and suppose the government of country X has the 
responsibility to keep the country X-country Y ex-
change rate at some designated value. That govern-
ment may have unlimited access to the currency of 
country Y; it may, that is, be able to borrow, perhaps 
at zero interest, any amount required to meet the 
private demand for that currency. If so, then there is 
cooperation, and the regime is the cooperative fixed 
exchange rate or C regime. If the government of 
country X does not have an unlimited line of credit, if 
it cannot in effect print country Y currency, then 
there is no cooperation, and the regime is the nonco-
operative fixed rate or N regime. 
The difference between the C and N regimes may 
be apparent. Briefly, it is that the C regime is in 
general economically feasible and the N regime is 
not. Under the C regime, the exchange rate of 
countries X and Y can be maintained indefinitely at 
any value, no matter what the budget policies of the 
two countries are. Under the N regime, though, no 
value of the exchange rate can be maintained indefi-
nitely by country X if its budget surplus, which may 
be positive or negative or zero, is less than the 
country Y surplus. If its surplus is greater than or the 
same as that of country Y, then it can maintain some 
exchange rate values indefinitely—but only those 
that undervalue its own money.
3 Thus, the N regime is 
economically feasible only when the government 
responsible for maintaining the exchange rate has a 
budget surplus no smaller than that of the other 
country and it undervalues its currency, perhaps 
appreciably. The Germany of the 1960s comes 
immediately to mind. 
But an exchange rate regime is not a practical 
real-world option just because it is economically 
feasible. It must also be politically feasible. And the C 
3We use the exchange rate equilibrium value under the PA/F 
regime as the norm. As noted later on, there is an equilibrium value for 
any choice of budget policies under this regime. The result just given, 
and all the others given here, are to be found with proofs in our paper, 
Samuelson's Consumption-Loan Model With Country-Specific Fiat 
Monies, Research Department Staff Report 24, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis, July 1978. 
5 regime, although economically feasible for any bud-
get policy choices, is politically feasible for almost 
none. What we mean is that under a cooperative fixed 
exchange rate regime, except for very special values 
of the budget surpluses, the residents of one of the 
countries permanently subsidize the residents of the 
other, more or less depending on the value at which 
the exchange rate is maintained.
4 Depending on what 
particular budget surpluses have been chosen, the 
residents of country X may permanently subsidize 
the residents of country Y or they may be subsidized 
by the residents of country Y. Here, though, which 
way the subsidy goes is less important than the fact 
that under the C regime a subsidy is generally paid. 
And the N regime, when economically feasible, is 
not politically feasible either. If under a nonco-
operative fixed exchange rate regime, country X is 
able to maintain a given exchange rate value indefi-
nitely, then the residents of country X are continu-
ously subsidizing the residents of country Y. 
The Feasible Alternatives 
What we have said about the fixed exchange rate 
regimes is neither original nor controversial, but 
rather, as most experts in international economics 
would insist, a critical part of the case for floating 
exchange rates. Strictly speaking, that is not so. But 
most experts do seem to share the feeling that 
governments should have autonomy, that they should 
not have to adopt those budget policies for which the 
cooperative (or noncooperative) regime is both 
economically and politically feasible. Some of the 
experts would maybe say that every country has a 
reasonably stable and exploitable Phillips curve and 
that, if only because tastes differ across countries, 
each government should be free to choose its own 
inflation-unemployment path. A more credible view 
is that each government should be able to choose its 
own inflation (or deflation) rate. Since countries are, 
of course, different, identical tax policies almost cer-
tainly would not be best for them all. For example, if 
the typical German is less given to income tax 
avoidance and/or evasion than the typical French 
person, as is often alleged, then the German govern-
ment probably should not rely as much as the French 
government on inflation as a means of taxation. 
Whatever the rationale, though, if autonomy is ac-
cepted as desirable, then the analysis which says that 
fixed rate regimes are in general not feasible is an 
argument for floating rates. 
Most experts also seem to share a distaste for 
capital controls. That is understandable. In a world 
with capital controls, rates of return on assets of 
equal risk may differ across countries. But if they do, 
then welfare-improving trades might be made. 
These two feelings—a distaste for capital con-
trols and a conviction that governments should have 
autonomy—explain why most experts in inter-
national economics favor the libertarian regime. But 
as we have seen, that regime is not a practical 
possibility; it does not have an equilibrium. So for a 
feasible international monetary system, governments 
must make a choice. 
They could choose not to have capital controls. 
The cooperative fixed exchange rate regime is eco-
nomically feasible when portfolio choices are un-
restricted. But that regime is politically feasible only 
when budget policies are coordinated. 
Or they could choose to have autonomy in 
budget policies. The portfolio autarky/floating rate 
or PA/F regime always has an equilibrium, whatever 
the budget policies of governments. If, for example, 
the government of country X has a smaller budget 
surplus than the government of country Y, if its total 
debt is increasing at a greater percentage rate than 
the debt of the government of country Y, then its 
money depreciates steadily relative to that of the 
government of country Y. Further, the PA/F regime 
is politically feasible, at least in the sense that there 
are no intercountry transfers even when budget 
policies are different. That is, at every equilibrium of 
that regime there is trade balance. But the PA/F 
regime is a regime of pervasive capital controls. 
A Case for Budget Policy Coordination 
Which alternative should governments choose? 
Our discussion so far could be summarized as a 
case for coordination of budget policies: For auton-
4For example, if the government of country X has a balanced 
budget and the government of country Y has a deficit which yields a 10 
percent per year increase in the supply of its money, then (abstracting 
from growth) at any fixed exchange rate the annual inflation rate is 
something between zero and 10 percent. In general, the inflation rate 
will be higher the greater is the value of country Y money relative to 
that of country X. And there is a transfer from the residents of country 
X to the residents of country Y, for only the government of country Y is 
getting command over resources as the world money supply increases. 
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private portfolio choices must be severely restricted. 
In particular, individuals cannot be left to decide for 
themselves what money to hold or use. Yet restricting 
portfolio choices is costly. Not only will interest rates 
differ across countries if governments have different 
budget policies, as they can under the PA/F regime, 
but there will also be compliance costs, which could 
be considerable. And the cost of restricting portfolio 
choices must be regarded as the cost of autonomy. 
That case is not, however, overwhelming. All we 
have established is that autonomy is not as advan-
tageous as at first blush it might seem. It is not as 
advantageous as it would be if the LF/F regime, the 
hands-off or libertarian regime favored by Professor 
Friedman and others, were a practical option. It is 
presumably worth something that each government 
be able to tax as it sees fit. And so, despite the costli-
ness of restricting portfolio choices, there may still 
be net advantage in governments having autonomy. 
We believe, though, that there is a stronger case 
for coordination than we have made here. Indeed, 
there is a persuasive case for continuing budget 
balance in all countries and for what is then fea-
sible—cooperatively maintained (fixed and not ad-
justable) exchange rates. But that is for another time. 